For years there’s been debate and confusion as to whether the silver market is being manipulated.
I’ve been fascinated by the subject, and recently started doing a book on the topic called “The Big Silver Short”. Which consists of interviews with the world’s top silver experts, and also includes an interview with former CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton.
Bart sadly passed away shortly after our interview, but in light of how I felt he wanted this information to be available to the public, I am publishing here the video and transcript of our interview.
Which contained a lot of stunning revelations by Bart, for which I am truly grateful that he shared with me before his passing.
Chris Marcus: Hello there my friends, Chris Marcus here with you for Arcadia Economics. We are continuing on with our book about the coverage of the silver market and all the fascinating things that have been going on. Really excited to have a guest today, Bart Chilton, former commissioner of the CFTC, who now hosts Boom Bust on RT America.
Who has such a fascinating perspective of what’s been going on in the metals, and to the degree that … obviously, we’re not going to ask you to share anything that’s confidential, but lots of topics to dig into.
Bart, thank you so much for joining me. It’s great to have you here today.
Bart Chilton: Well, I appreciate your service and you looking at these issues Chris and working on the book. And these pieces will be an important integral part of that. I’m honored to spend some time with you Chris.
Chris Marcus: Well, I appreciate that, and I guess just to start, maybe if you could give people a quick rundown of your background, especially at the CFTC. And just for those who might not be aware, what the CFTC’s role is in policing the markets. And then maybe we can get into some of the other topics from there.
Bart Chilton: Sure. My first job out of high school was in a steel mill, and so I became a guy that had sympathy for average working folks. And then I spent 30 years in government, both in the House and the Senate, different administrations, Republicans, Democrats. But always tried to look out for those average folks back from the steel mills, and others like them, and I carried that to my last government job. Which as you said, I was a commissioner at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
And it’s a little bit of a tongue twister acronym, but the markets that we policed, which are commodity markets, were things like soybeans and cattle and oil and gold and silver, that are integrally important to everything that goes on in our lives. Whether or not it’s transportation because of oil, or eating because of food, they make the world go round.
We are really the sister agency, the CFTC to the Securities and Exchange Commission. And we looked over the commodity markets to ensure that they were free of fraud, manipulation, and malfeasance the best we could. We caught a lot of bad guys, but there’s still a lot of bad guys and gals out there. There were then, and there continue to be today. But it’s a rewarding job, and in that position, I was able to say what I wanted, because you can’t be fired.
And I did so for anybody who was paying attention. I was particularly tough on large financial institutions, but not only them; any market participant who violated the law, I was tough on. But, I certainly did not spare the large banks. You can name any one of them, and I was pretty tough on them, and vocally tough on them. So, it’s a great job and really enjoyed it.
Chris Marcus: Yes, it’s an important role in the market, and obviously in the silver community, we’ve heard a lot about the CFTC and allegations of inappropriate behavior in the silver market.
How did you first hear about that, was it when Andrew Maguire contacted you back… I believe it was 2009 or 2010, or… how did you first become aware of, at least, just the premise that many felt something might not be right in silver, and gold as well, but primarily silver?
Bart Chilton: Emails. Andrew did contact me, but he wasn’t the first. I think Ted Butler contacted me, some other people contacted me, and many others. I mean, hundreds of others contacted me through emails, and I responded to every one of them. Every one of them that wasn’t calling me a rat or other names, I responded to them.
And all times of the day, I responded to them, and all through the weekend, I responded to them. I ended up being the only commissioner … there are five commissioners at the CFTC… who felt like it was a responsibility to do so. Matter of fact, the other commissioners all got those emails blocked from their computers, which I found pretty disappointing.
Market participants, those in the US especially, but even others should have regulators be accountable to them. They were all complaining, but they didn’t have any hard evidence. They just said, “Well, you know, the price should be higher.”
And then it wasn’t until the silver whistleblower, Andrew Maguire, over in London, got on the phone with me, and he sent me some emails, and he described what he thought might happen. And he did it over a series of maybe a month or six weeks. He said, “Watch the market between this time and that time.” And a lot of these were around the openings, by the way. “And I bet you the price goes up, or I bet you the price goes down,” or whatever he would suggest.
And it didn’t occur every time, but like, seven out of ten times, he was right. And so that gave me some evidence that said that there’s something going on here, and that’s when I asked for the enforcement folks to open an investigation. Other commissioners agreed with that. And so, what began a too long investigation started with that.
Chris Marcus: Yeah, well, it was fascinating. Again, I remember reading that exchange with Andrew Maguire, and I believe it was Eliud Ramirez, where like you said, he pointed out some manipulations, and I’ve heard you comment how a lot of these did play out.
As that investigation was going on, obviously there was that memorable 2010 meeting.
One thing that I was always confused about was … my understanding was that shortly after the emails Maguire sent, I remember he was supposed to appear at the meeting, but then somehow (his appearance as a witness) was canceled. Are you able to comment at all on what happened?
Because I think that’s something that a lot of people have been confused by, where I agree and appreciate what you said, and can confirm how you did respond to people’s emails. Although it often felt to folks like a lot of the other commissioners weren’t doing the same thing; and curious, what happened where Maguire was not allowed to speak at that meeting?
Bart Chilton: I’m not sure that’s the case. You’d have to check the record, but I don’t know that he was banned from speaking or anything. I remember that I included Bill Murphy of GATA on the gold front in that meeting. And I’m not sure if Ted Butler came to that meeting or not, but I certainly don’t recall that Andrew was uninvited, or that he was not allowed to come. That’s not my recollection of what happened.
But he wasn’t there. But I don’t know that he wanted to testify. Once you become a whistleblower, you provide your evidence and your information to the investigators. And I know that he did sit down with investigators or at least on the phone, maybe in person and speak with them.
We have the information and would it have been better if he wanted to have it out in the public, probably. But as far as I know, he wasn’t banned or anything like that, but you could ask him. I still I’m in contact with Andrew pretty regularly. He’s a gem of a person, honest, and a credible character by any stretch of the imagination. I’m sure he can tell you.
Chris Marcus: Well, we’re hoping to get him on board for this. So we’ll look forward to running that by him.
Although along the lines of that meeting, I was actually watching one of the videos again the other day. And I know that between Jeff Christian and Adrian Douglas, they were disputing whether the metal was actually there to back the paper claims. Whether it be contracts on the COMEX or derivatives, curious to your thoughts, as it seems to me like we’re in a situation where we now have a fractional banking system in the metals.
From what you’ve seen, is there actually metal in existence that these claims could be fulfilled? Or is there an imbalance in there somewhere?
Bart Chilton: There’s never in silver, in soybeans, in oil.. there’s never enough physical to back up all of the contracts.. the futures contracts… there never is. I think a good gauge was 10 to one. I’m not sure about gold and silver, but an overarching theme among all commodities…10 to one. Now our futures are essentially, and traders hate when I say this, but they’re essentially bets. They’re gambles.
And if they don’t play out, everybody’s not collecting them all at the same time. When there’s an expiration, people get out of the contracts because nobody wants to hold onto a bunch of crude oil. They don’t have enough swimming pools around in their yards. So there’s never enough. And that fact that there’s never enough seems to me to be some basis for a lot of the conspiracy theories in the silver community.
“Well, it’s not there, so it must be messed up, there must be something sneaky going on.”
Well, it happens with every single commodity. It’s how the system works. Now you can debate whether or not it’s good or bad, but if you want futures contracts, you’re going to have more out there in contracts than there is physical supply for.
Just the way it is, they’re futures contracts. Look, there’s a lot of other things that I think were shady in the silver market, but the fact that there wasn’t enough silver to back up all the futures contracts, which would never be redeemed at the same time anyway… I think was just a Trojan horse to get into nutty conversations at times.
Chris Marcus: Although you mentioned that were other many other things you saw that did raise the alarm. Anything that you can get into, again while respecting the confidentiality with the agency.
Bart Chilton: Sure.
Well, there’s some stuff that’s out there in the public that I’m not sure everybody put together. Most people did. I would never, for example, and I won’t now, say that there was a bank and name it, that held close to 40% of the silver market at one point.
But the news reports … I mean… people surmise it’s JP Morgan Chase. And the news reports in the public records show that when Bear Stearns collapsed, that their silver positions got transferred over to JP Morgan.
And we, the CTFC, had to approve those positions. Because the Bear Stearns positions… when they came over, combined with JP’s positions, were so large that they violated the position limits which one trader could hold. So the CFTC had to approve that JP could take on the Bear silver positions.
If people want to do the math… they can do the math on who had the largest silver position. But there was an exception that we made, and that’s in the public record.
What’s not really looked at too much, is that we made that allowance for a time certain. And I forget exactly how long it was, but it was not years, it was months. Maybe it was three months or six months, or maybe it was nine months. I think it was probably six, but I don’t recall. And that allowance was for them to be able to get out of those positions.
Chris Marcus: Right.
Bart Chilton: Well, one thing we didn’t know right at first is that the head silver trader for Bear… he went with the silver positions to JP, and so he’s trading at JP. And after this time was coming to an end, the runway which we had given for them to get out of the positions in excess of position limits, they were nowhere close to getting out of them. Matter of fact, at one point they bought even more.
Which was in direct conflict of what we had in mind. And so they were granted a little bit more time, a couple of months as I recall, and they did ultimately get down to the position limit.
But it was at that time when they were so large that I made the comment about how large a particular bank was in the market. Which sort of shocked people, and it shocked me quite frankly, that it was so large.
Anyway, these were troubling times, and a lot of this was going on at a certain time period in which our investigators were looking at market participants. Including those at that institution, that had such large positions, to ensure that everything was okay. And the bottom line is, we found a lot of things that indicated things were not okay. And I talked about that a little bit.
Chris Marcus: Yes, and for folks who might be a little bit newer to it, can you explain why a big concentrated position is something that the CFT looks for and is on the watch for to be careful about, and how that impacts the market, or has the potential to impact the market?
Bart Chilton: Well, if you and I are trading in the futures markets for our personal account, nobody’s going to notice. But if you’re got a sizable position, and you trade that sizable position, it’s one thing if you just have it. But if you’re trading it, then all of a sudden 20% of the market goes long or goes short, that can move markets.
And so that’s why there are not what I want with regards to position limits. Although that’s a whole other topic, of further position limits.
But there are some position limits in what is called the spot month. That’s the delivery month. That month where you hope everybody doesn’t get a pool full of oil. And so there are limits in the spot months. There are not limits in what we call the back months.Those limits I pushed for, but they have not been put in place, even though they’re required by law.
Traders that have large positions that are approaching those limits, or are above those limits, or have an exemption from those limits, they are traders that could royal markets with large trades.
It doesn’t mean that there are problems just because they have the positions. But they’re certainly suspect and regulators look at those things because they can push your whole market around inappropriately, and that can damage a lot of average folks and a lot of other traders.
Chris Marcus: Right. And again, you mentioned the position that went from Bear Stearns to JP Morgan, which was in 2008 when we saw silver go from about $21 to $9. Do you think that those two were connected, and that the position that JP Morgan eventually had the waiver for had an influence on the price back then?
Bart Chilton: Don’t know. I was about to say, I can’t say, but it’s not that I can’t say because, the truth is I don’t know.
I saw no evidence of such.
Chris Marcus: Okay.
Another year that we had a wild series of price moves in silver was obviously 2011. Again, we had Bernanke, and I believe it was October of 2010, launch QE2. I bought a thousand ounce block of silver in response to that. So I say that in the sense that it was logical to me that part of the run up was in response to a lot of money printing.
We hit $49 dollars in April and then the price crashed down and has been in a bear market ever since. Any thoughts or anything you’d like to comment on about the price, especially in 2011 or what’s happened since?
Bart Chilton: Well, precious metals are essentially a safe haven. So when you see things like what you saw, and why you bought, that makes all the sense in the world. But ideally these things are supposed to operate under markets fundamentals, and those involve supply and demand. And they involve the number of traders out there, and who’s willing to risk and how long they’re willing to risk it.
I’m away from it now. We cover this on our television program. We look at precious metals all the time. But I’m certainly not in a position now to see anything in the markets, that if something untoward was going on, I wouldn’t necessarily know about it. I certainly wouldn’t know the details about it.
But I can tell you that things were suspect, and the investigation that we did uncovered a lot of evidence that would lead to a manipulation case. Or an attempted manipulation case.
But the standard of evidence, the cumulative standard of evidence, was a very high bar. And so while we did have evidence, direct evidence, voicemail evidence, text evidence, trading evidence… at some point we had price movement evidence… but we never had all of the things that you needed together in one place that were enough for us to go after. There were just holes, and it was frustrating.
And we looked at it a bunch of different ways, and at one point we even thought we had enough to go forward with the case. And we asked for some forensic economists outside of the CFTC to examine it. And they came back and they said, “Oh, we don’t think so.” And that was after about four years.
By the way, and I’ve never talked about this, but that was after about four years, and I said, “Whoa, Whoa, wait a minute. We thought we had enough evidence, and we hire somebody outside and they say, we don’t have enough evidence. Let’s go to somebody else.”
People don’t know this part, but I essentially extended the investigation yet another year, because I didn’t believe it. And so we went to yet another forensic economist, and had it looked at, and they came back with the opinion of the first folks. That we didn’t have the traders, and we didn’t have the market participants dead to rights.
But we had lots of stuff, and we had real stuff that would have played really well in court. Not just numbers, but the rhetoric…the banter between traders that we had. And I’m not saying there was lots of it, but there was enough of it, that it was damning. But the damning part had to be backed up by other requirements of evidence under the law. And we didn’t get all of that. We didn’t get to that.
It troubled me so much by the way, that I did seek a change in the law, and we ultimately got it. And we have the newer lower standard for manipulation that’s been in place since that time. It was not retroactive, the lower standard of manipulation for the CFTC, which is similar to the SEC’s standard for manipulation. I think it’s their 10b-5 standard, which is based upon recklessness.
So instead of having these four different hurtles that I was describing earlier, that were pretty high for us to get over, there’s a new standard, that I fought for, and that Maria Cantwell was the champion in the Senate on this by the way…although there were others like Bernie Sanders… but Maria Cantwell was the real champion… that now there’s a lower manipulation standard. One that would be easier to prove.
Would the same evidence back then result in a charge and a potential conviction on manipulation? I think so.
I think so.
But that’s something that we will never see. It wasn’t a grandfather thing. The law was the law then, and I’m glad we changed it. But it may be one of the small, for lack of a better word, silver rays of light in this whole debacle.
Chris Marcus: Yeah, that’s really fascinating to hear you mention that. Again a lot of this I’ve followed, and it’s certainly interesting, especially since in the time after that we’ve had Deutsche Bank have a settlement. Where they released some trader transcripts which were not very positive. And then of course more recently we had a former JP Morgan trader, John Edmonds plead guilty to the Department of Justice.
I thought it was particularly interesting that he mentioned what he did (he pled guilty to spoofing), but mentioned that it was with the knowledge of his superiors, and widespread practice at the firm.
Would love to hear any thoughts you have on that, because essentially…maybe further verification of what you were investigating and advocating, and just talking about as well.
Bart Chilton: Well, spoofing is another thing that wasn’t against the law when a lot of these nefarious trades were taking place. Spoofing was a Dodd-Frank invention, another thing I worked on. Another thing that Maria Cantwell worked on by the way, and spoofing essentially came out to being part and parcel of manipulation. You spoof to manipulate markets. You spoof to push markets up or down, and then you take the opposite position.
We ultimately … I forget when we ultimately did the rule… because even though you passed the law, once a law is passed, then you have to promulgate. Tough word, but promulgate is the word we use for actually implementing the rule. And that took a while. I had to define what the word spoofing meant. And more importantly, what it didn’t mean. Because people take gambles in markets all the time. But it’s essentially sending out false price signals on trades that you never intend to execute.
And that phrase “never intend”, is a tough one to define because how can you define somebody’s intent? I said, “well, Chris, I intended on doing it.” You said, “Well, no, you didn’t.” But how do you know I didn’t intend on it?
So it’s sort of a weasel word, but we did the best we could on it. Although the statute’s been used effectively… used against an HFT trader in Chicago a couple of times actually.
So the law is working. But all of these laws, whether it’s the recklessness manipulation standard I mentioned, or whether it’s spoofing or any other law, rule, or regulation, these things need to constantly be living documents to ensure that they are keeping up with market participants and what they’re doing. Because boy, these traders, they’ll look for any way to get a competitive advantage.
And sometimes that enters into an area that is a little grey. And sometimes if they get into that grey area, they will really take advantage of it. And regulators and lawmakers need to be aware of that and constantly be analyzing the rules and regulations, and updating them so that they’re appropriate for the circumstances. So that we don’t have an environment like we did with silver where we had all the evidence and just couldn’t get them because the law and the rules were too stringent. And the stuff we had was pretty damning, but just not enough.
Chris Marcus: Yes, and certainly from my experience on Wall Street, I can confirm what you’re saying about how unfortunately, if you leave a little room for error, some traders out there will try and exploit that.
Again, I appreciate you mentioning the spoofing. And I’m curious, because my understanding of how some of the manipulation has occurred is that if silver is trading $20.05, there are a lot of stop orders placed around the $20 handle. And often, if the price can get pushed a little bit, then you get a lot of those high frequency algorithms kicking in, and you see a drop, with many feeling that people nudging the price a little, are the same ones buying it back lower. Does that sound like a reasonably accurate portrayal to put it in perspective for folks? Or would you phrase it differently?
Bart Chilton: Well, it’s a good portrayal. Actually, it’s a very good portrayal. But it’s actually also a reflection of what I was just speaking about. How trading has changed. Even back in 2008, 2009, 2010, and maybe a little bit of 2011, even when a lot of these silver trades, and some gold trades were pretty suspect when you were looking at them, you didn’t have high frequency traders in these markets like you do today.
And they’re still not all over them. But spoofing meant one thing when it was an average person out there saying they’re going to sell a hundred lot of something, and they’re trying to take the price up a penny. And if they get it to go up a penny, they offer half a penny, and they make a half a penny where they weren’t going to make anything. And then they pull back those other offers for a penny, right?
They say, “I’ll sell these things for a penny more than anybody else is offering.” And the price ticks up, and a couple of people might take advantage, but then they pull back the offer real quick, and then they say, “Now I’ll sell it for this amount.” And they get a bunch of buyers.
So, markets are changing. And you have these high frequency traders who are getting into more and more areas. And at first they weren’t in the futures. They weren’t into the commodities. But now they’re getting into them, particularly oil, and some of the larger traders – T-bills. And they’re getting into gold and silver. Less so pork bellies, cattle, and stuff. But what the high frequency traders want is volume. I call them cheetahs. Not because they’re like Boston card cheaters. But because they’re fast, like the cheetahs in the jungle.
And they’re trying to prey upon any little time lapse that they can see. But they’ve got to have volume to make those changes. And they serve a purpose, the cheetahs, because they add liquidity to markets. If there’s somebody who wants to buy or sell, cheetah’s will take them. They’ll do it. They’re just going to offload it one way or another. In the meantime they’ll be so quick that they’re trying to make just little micro pennies in nanoseconds.
The difference in your description is that today, when a market moves because of a spoof, it could move a lot more. People hadn’t really … I mean maybe two or three times in history, you heard about a flash crash. But it really wasn’t until 2010 that when we had this major flash crash that started in S&P minis in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group.
And then there was contagion in the S&P 500 mini futures contracts. And there was contagion into the equities related markets. It wasn’t until then that people really started to hear this term flash crash. And since that time there’s been a dozen… maybe 15 of them. And we had a big investigation back then on that one that I pointed to with the SEC and the CFTC. It still stands as a really hard look at what was going on.
But the bottom line is HFTs were involved in the markets. They didn’t do anything wrong. We thought they might have, but there was never any cases that came out of it. But we thought they may have, but the bottom line is, they’re doing what they do. They’re in the markets.
They were in the markets when markets were going down. They saw this 75,000 lot being traded, and they just took advantage of it, and traded and traded and traded and traded. They took the other side and the market went down faster than anybody thought it ever had.
Chris Marcus: Right.
Bart Chilton: It flash crashed. And then fortunately because they were in the market, the untold story, the other part of that story, is that HFTs actually helped bring the price back up. Because while it crashed (I think AT&T went down to a penny) it was the HFTs who were in the market taking advantage of the buyback too.
Markets are different now. So to my point about trying to make sure that regulations are right sized, when we wrote the spoofing law (it was a Dodd Frank thing), it didn’t get implemented for a couple more years.
Is it correct as written now?
It’s been used effectively. So a lot of people or a regulator would probably say, yeah, sure. It’s been used. It’s great. No problem.
I’d say it’s worth a look. Given what we know about how many times traders are trading, maybe there are times, Chris… I love this figure because it’s so amazing… there are times that we looked at, particularly during the close where high frequency traders are trading 450 to 500 times in the aggregate, per second. Crazy numbers.
And they want somebody to analyze those trades? 450 to 500 times per second?!
So we’re in a whole new world of trading, and we need to ensure that the laws are updated to have an environment in which we can endeavor to the fullest extent to catch the bad guys and those who are trying to be bad actors in these important markets that impact the economic engine of our democracy.
Chris Marcus: Yeah, it’s like you said, it’s fascinating the way finance has changed. The world has changed. Everything’s so digital. We’re not using hand signals on the floor to do everything anymore.
Bart Chilton: Right.
Chris Marcus: Perhaps just one final question before we wrap up and let you go, as I sure do appreciate your time today. Just with the JP Morgan case with the Department of Justice, again no one knows the future, but do you have any thoughts on how that plays out? And whether you think some of the things that you and the CFTC were trying to bring to light, that perhaps the Department of Justice will be able to do so going forward?
Bart Chilton: Well, nothing specific. But I can tell you that during this whole time we were doing the investigation, something that wasn’t covered, because there really wasn’t any action or reason to cover it, was that we were keeping the DOJ up to date on what we are doing. They had a couple of briefings during what ended up being the five years in total of the investigation.
I can’t tell you how many times we briefed them on it. Dozens and dozens and dozens. And I had probably a hundred meetings on silver separate from those commission briefings. But there were ongoing conversations with the DOJ about what we were finding, and they wanted to be updated. But when we said we weren’t going forward, they said they were not going forward either.
They usually take these things as a referral, and fortunately they are real serious about it. Unfortunately, they don’t have the manpower to go after as many bad actors as I think the country deserves. Back in the day, and I’m talking about back during this time period from 2008-2012, only about 25% of the referrals that we sent to DOJ did they accept. 75% they rejected, and only 25% did they accept.
Chris Marcus: Right.
Bart Chilton: We never sent them something that we didn’t win on. We weren’t sending them things and saying, “oh, we didn’t get this, maybe you can.” These were all things that we won on. That we either got a conviction or a settlement. We were winners on these things and we said we think that you should put the folks behind bars. So I don’t have anything negative to say about any individual in the DOJ. I think this is a reflection of Congress and budget policies about where staff resources need to go, and the DOJ criminal division is one that deserves certainly more resources.
The number of referrals rejected was less over at the SEC back then. I don’t remember the number, but still was above 50%. It may have been 60%. It was less than ours, but it was still above 50% I remember that. And so, lots of bad actors may have been fined, but as that old detective series Beretta used to say, if you do the crime, you should do the time. Not just just pay a fine. And so more people I think should be doing time when they violate these important financial laws.
Chris Marcus: Yes, I can certainly understand that. And fortunately as I get older…I’ve crossed 40 in the past year, I’m getting better at accepting what we can’t change and what we can. And while there are certain things that are out of our control, I really do appreciate all the effort that you’ve put into this over the years.
I actually contacted the five CFTC commissioners a couple of years back. And like you mentioned before, you were the only one to respond. And I think especially when people see things going on, obviously we all want things to be fair, but really even just having someone that’s accountable and comes out and speaks and lets folks know what’s going on means a lot.
I’m truly grateful for what you’re doing, what you’ve done and the great things you’ll be doing going forward. So perhaps just to close out, maybe one last time you can mention the show and where people can find you and stay up to date on the great research you’re doing.
Bart Chilton: Sure. Well, I’ve been really pleased. I’ve been doing this show on RT America and it’s broadcast globally. And it’s great because the business of finance show, it’s every day of the week. It’s called Boom Bust. And you can get it in the US, a bunch of places. You can get it on Direct TV, Dish, and Comcast right now. Or you can always check it out at youtube.com/boombustrt.
And I continue to have, I think, a different voice in finance and business. I continue to call them as I see them, and you can check us out there.
Thank you so much, Chris, I appreciate your time you’re willing to devote to this important subject, and feel free to let me know if I can ever be of help in the future.
Chris Marcus: Well, I sure appreciate that Bart. That’s kind of you to say as you’ve been a big help in my career, just helping me to see some of these things and keep going. Really a great pleasure to catch up with you today. Thanks so much for joining me, and look forward to staying in touch my friend.
Bart Chilton: Good luck, my friend. Thank you.
June 7, 2019